Broken Sentence Promise Required Vacatur of the Guilty Plea
The Third Department determined defendant’s guilty plea was induced by County Court’s promise to impose a sentence of shock incarceration. At sentencing, County Court refused to order shock incarceration. Because the plea was induced by the broken promise, the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The fact that neither the People nor County Court could guarantee defendant’s participation in the shock incarceration program was deemed irrelevant:
We start with the principle that a trial court always “retains discretion in fixing an appropriate sentence up until the time of sentencing” … . However, when the court wishes to depart from a promised sentence, it must either honor the promise or give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea … . Accordingly, “[a] guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored” … .
Here, prior to defendant’s guilty plea, County Court indicated its belief that defendant was eligible for shock incarceration and then unequivocally promised that it “would order him into it.” When defendant specifically asked if shock incarceration was guaranteed, the court stated that it “would order it absolutely” and that a failure on the part of prison authorities to admit him would “defy an order of the [c]ourt.” Furthermore, defense counsel stated that he was recommending that defendant accept the plea agreement “especially with a shock commitment.” Thus, regardless of the fact that “neither County Court nor the People possessed the authority to guarantee [defendant’s] participation” in the shock incarceration program … , the record reflects that defendant, in accepting the plea, relied upon County Court’s promise to do exactly that. Consequently, we find that defendant’s plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and that, because County Court’s promise to defendant cannot be honored as a matter of law, he is entitled to vacatur of his guilty plea … . People v Muhammad, 2015 NY Slip Op 07702, 3rd Dept 10-22-15