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Church Had No Special Relationship With Plaintiff, Church Had No Authority to Exercise Control Over Conduct of Man Who Injured Plaintiff/Therefore Church Did Not Owe Plaintiff a Duty of Care

The Second Department determined the defendant church was properly granted summary judgment in a case stemming from an altercation between, Edward,  the husband of a church employee (Rhonda), and plaintiff, a pedestrian on a public sidewalk (presumably outside the church). It was alleged that Rhonda encouraged and facilitated an assault on plaintiff by Edward. The respondeat superior cause of action was properly dismissed because Rhonda was not acting within the scope of her employment during the altercation. And the negligence cause of action was properly dismissed because there was no special relationship between the church and the plaintiff, and, therefore, the church did not owe plaintiff a duty of care:

” For a defendant to be held liable in tort, it must have owed the injured party a duty of care'” … . “The existence and extent of a duty is a question of law” … .

“Generally, there is no duty to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from causing injury to others,’ even where, as a practical matter, the defendant could have exercised such control … . A duty to control the conduct of others requires a special relationship: “a relationship between defendant and a third person whose actions expose plaintiff to harm such as would require the defendant to attempt to control the third person’s conduct; or a relationship between the defendant and plaintiff requiring defendant to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of others” … .

Here, the church made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging negligence, insofar as asserted against it, by establishing that owed no duty to the plaintiff. Its submissions demonstrated that it had no relationship with the plaintiff, who was a pedestrian on a public sidewalk … . Further, the church established that it did not have the necessary authority or ability to exercise the requisite control over Edward’s conduct so as to give rise to a duty to control his conduct for the protection of off-premises pedestrians … . Rodriguez v Judge, 2015 NY Slip Op 07828, 2nd Dept 10-28-15

 

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