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Substantial Evidence Did Not Support Department of Health’s Finding that Property Transfers Rendered Petitioner Ineligible for Medicaid Benefits

The Second Department annulled the Department of Health’s (DOH’s) finding that petitioner was ineligible for Medicaid benefits based on transfers of property made well before she exhibited signs of dementia. The court explained the analytical criteria:

In reviewing a Medicaid eligibility determination made after a fair hearing, the court must review the record as a whole to determine if the agency’s decisions are supported by substantial evidence and are not affected by an error of law … . Substantial evidence has been defined as “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” … . While the level of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence, substantial evidence does not arise from bare surmise, conjecture, speculation, or rumor (see id. at 180), or from the absence of evidence supporting a contrary conclusion … . When determining Medicaid eligibility, an agency is required to “look back” for a period of 60 months immediately preceding the first date the applicant was both “institutionalized” and had applied for Medicaid benefits to determine if any asset transfers were uncompensated or made for less than fair market value (42 USC § 1396p[c][1][A], [B]; Social Services Law § 366[5][e][1][vi]). If such a transfer was made during that period, the applicant may become ineligible for Medicaid benefits for a specified period of time (see 42 USC § 1396p[c][1][A], [E]; Social Services Law § 366[5][e][3]), unless there is a “satisfactory showing” that, inter alia, the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical assistance (42 USC § 1396p[c][2][C][i], [iii]; Social Services Law § 366[5][e][4][iii]). It is the petitioner’s burden to rebut the presumption that the transfer of funds was motivated, in part if not in whole, by anticipation of a future need to qualify for medical assistance … .

Here, the evidence at the fair hearing showed that the latest of the subject transfers was made approximately two years before the petitioner started to exhibit signs of dementia. At the time of the transfers and in the years preceding her need for nursing home care, the petitioner was in good health and living independently. She was driving, cooking, exercising, and paying her own bills. The transfers themselves constituted gifts to her relatives, and the petitioner still had more than $250,000, not including Social Security benefits, following the transfers. Under these circumstances, the petitioner met her burden of rebutting the presumption that the subject transfers were motivated by the anticipation of a future need to qualify for medical assistance … . Matter of Sandoval v Shah, 2015 NY Slip Op 07034, 2nd Dept 9-30-15

 

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