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Trustees Were Not Required by Town Law to Turn Over to the Town Board Trust Revenues Generated by Water Management in the Town of Southampton

In a detailed decision which traces the history of a trust and statutes governing town finances in the Town of Southampton from pre-colonial times to the present, the Second Department determined that the “Trustees of the Freeholders and Commonality of the Town of Southampton” (Trustees) were not obligated by Town Law to turn over trust revenues from water management to the Town Board:

For nearly 400 years, the Trustees of the Freeholders and Commonalty of the Town of Southampton (hereinafter the Trustees or the Trust) have had the right, derived from royal land grants and patents, to control and manage the waters of the town. In the present day, the Trustees raise revenue from issuing licenses for activities including commercial fishing, charging permit fees for seasonal boat docking, dock and bulkhead construction, and dredging, and selling sand excavated from Mecox Bay. The Trustees deposit their revenues into several bank accounts, which, at the time this action was commenced, had an aggregate balance of close to $1 million. On this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether Town Law § 64(1) requires the Trustees to turn over control of their revenues to the Town Board of the Town of Southampton (hereinafter the Town Board) and whether the expenditure of such revenues must therefore comply with the same statutes which govern town finances and expenditures. We conclude that Town Law § 64(1) does not require the Trustees to turn over control of their revenues to the Town Board, and that the statutes governing town finances and expenditures relied upon by the plaintiffs are inapplicable to the Trust. Gessin v Throne-Holst, 2015 NY Slip Op 06885, 2nd Dept 9-23-15

 

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