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Collapse of Rotten Floor First Revealed When Carpet Was Removed Was Not Foreseeable—Labor Law 240(1) Cause of Action Properly Dismissed—Defect Was Latent and Was Not Caused by Owner—Labor Law 200 and Common-Law Negligence Causes of Action Properly Dismissed

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s fall through a rotted portion of subfloor exposed when carpeting was removed was not foreseeable.  Therefore the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action, the Labor Law 200 cause of action, and the common-law negligence cause of action against the owner of the property were properly dismissed:

In order for liability to be imposed under Labor Law § 240(1), there must be “a foreseeable risk of injury from an elevation-related hazard . . . as [d]efendants are liable for all normal and foreseeable consequences of their acts'” … . Thus, the collapse or partial collapse of a permanent floor may give rise to liability under Labor Law § 240(1) where ” circumstances are such that there is a foreseeable need for safety devices'” … . Here, however, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the partial collapse of a small section the basement subfloor and, in turn, the need for safety devices to protect the injured plaintiff from an elevation-related hazard, were foreseeable. Consequently, since the plaintiffs did not meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability with respect to the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) .. . * * *

Where, as here, a plaintiff’s alleged injury arose not from the manner in which the work was performed, but from an allegedly dangerous condition on the premises, a property owner moving for summary judgment dismissing causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 has the initial burden of showing only that it neither created the dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of it … . A defendant has constructive notice of a defect when it is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident such that it could have been discovered and corrected … . “When a defect is latent and would not be discoverable upon a reasonable inspection, constructive notice may not be imputed” … . Here, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the defect in the subfloor, which was latent and not discoverable upon a reasonable inspection. The defendant further demonstrated that it did not create the defect. Carrillo v Circle Manor Apts., 2015 NY Slip Op 06652, 2nd Dept 8-26-15

 

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