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Failure to Directly Address a Juror’s Stated Bias Required Reversal—“Bright Line” Rule Explained

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined that, once the prospective juror (No. 383) expressed a bias based upon the age difference between the adult defendant and child complainant, the failure to gain the assurance from the juror that her prior state of mind will not influence her verdict and she will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence constituted reversible error. The fact that the juror assured the judge she would not vote to convict if she had a reasonable doubt and that she would follow the law as instructed was not enough to address the expressed age-related bias.  A juror who has expressed a bias must unambiguously assure the court she will put her bias aside:

Once a prospective juror has identified his or her own biased perspective, he or she “must expressly state that his [or her] prior state of mind concerning either the case or either of the parties will not influence his [or her] verdict, and he [or she] must also state that he [or she] will render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence” … . “[N]othing less than a personal, unequivocal assurance of impartiality can cure a juror’s prior indication that [he or] she is predisposed against a particular defendant or particular type of case” …, and, accordingly, the “bright-line standard . . . followed throughout the state” is “that a prospective juror who expresses partiality towards [one party] and cannot unequivocally promise to set aside this bias should be removed for cause” … . * * *

Considering the entirety of the questions posed to juror No. 383 and her responses, juror No. 383 unambiguously acknowledged a form of bias — based on the respective ages of the victim and defendant — that she identified as preventing her from being a fair and impartial juror. After juror No. 383 identified her own bias, she was never asked a question that referenced whether she could set aside any biases she held, generally, or whether she could set aside her specific bias regarding the respective ages of defendant and the victim. Further, in her responses to questions posed to her, juror No. 383 never specifically made reference to the age issue after she identified it as preventing her from being fair and impartial, and she never agreed, more generally, that she could set aside any bias that she held and decide the case in a fair and impartial manner based on the evidence presented. Therefore, juror No. 383 did not “unambiguously state that, despite preexisting opinions that might indicate bias, [she would] decide the case impartially and based on the evidence,” because she never made any statement regarding her preexisting opinion, let alone an unambiguous statement that she could set such opinion aside (People v Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363)[FN3]. Accordingly, County Court committed reversible error in denying defendant’s for-cause challenge to a juror who never contradicted or retracted her statement that her bias related to the respective ages of defendant and the victim prevented her from being a fair and impartial juror … . People v Warrington, 2015 NY Slip Op 06380, 3rd Dept 7-30-15

 

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