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Analytical Criteria for a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action Where Plaintiff Submits an Affidavit/Analytical Criteria for a Motion to Amend the Complaint

The Second Department determined the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should not have been granted with respect to one of the defendants, and the motion to amend the complaint should have been granted. The court explained the proper way to handle a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action when the plaintiff submits an affidavit in opposition, as well as the criteria for a motion to amend the complaint:

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), “the court should accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . “Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, or whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove [his or her] claims, of course, plays no part in the determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss” … . Unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3211(c), affidavits may be received for a limited purpose only, usually to remedy defects in the complaint, and such affidavits are not to be examined for the purpose of determining whether there is evidentiary support for the pleading … . ” [A] court may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint'” … * * *

CPLR 3025(b) provides that courts may grant leave to parties to amend or supplement their pleadings, and, “[i]n the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, such applications are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” … . Here, the Supreme Court improperly denied that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint insofar as asserted against [one defendant]. No surprise or prejudice resulted from any delay in the plaintiff’s motion, and the proposed amendment is neither palpably insufficient nor patently without merit insofar as it pertains to that defendant … . Tirpack v 125 N. 10, LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 06236, 2nd Dept 7-22-15

 

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