You are here: / / Criteria for Common Law or Implied Indemnification Explained

Criteria for Common Law or Implied Indemnification Explained

In affirming Supreme Court’s denial of summary judgment to the defendants in a construction-accident case, the Third Department clearly explained the criteria for common law or implied indemnification.  In a nutshell, any negligence by the party seeking indemnification for payments made to the injured party on behalf of a negligent tortfeasor will preclude recovery. Common law or implied indemnification applies only to parties who are liable vicariously without fault:

“The principle of common-law, or implied indemnification, permits one who has been compelled to pay for the wrong of another to recover from the wrongdoer the damages it paid to the injured party. Since the predicate of common-law indemnity is vicarious liability without actual fault on the part of the proposed indemnitee, it follows that a party who has itself actually participated to some degree in the wrongdoing cannot receive the benefit of the doctrine” … . Accordingly, in order “[t]o establish a claim for common-law indemnification, the party seeking indemnity must prove not only that it was not guilty of any negligence beyond the statutory liability, but must also prove that the proposed indemnitor was guilty of some negligence that contributed to the cause of the accident” … . Hackert v Emmanuel Cong. United Church of Christ, 2015 NY Slip Op 06192, 3rd Dept 7-16-15

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE STATUTE STATES THAT EMPIRE ZONE REAL PROPERTY TAX CREDITS ARE AVAILABLE WHEN THE TAX PAYER MAKES DIRECT PAYMENTS TO THE TAXING AUTHORITY, PETITIONERS WERE ENTITLED TO THE TAX CREDITS EVEN THOUGH THE PAYMENTS WERE MADE FROM A MORTGAGE TAX ESCROW ACCOUNT (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT WAS IN A PRISON AS A VISITOR WHEN THERE WAS A CANINE ALERT TO DRUGS ON HER PERSON, THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE SUCH THAT ANY QUESTIONING SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRECEDED BY THE MIRANDA WARNINGS; A REASONABLE PERSON WOULD NOT HAVE FELT FREE TO LEAVE; BECAUSE THEY WERE CLOSE IN TIME, BOTH HER ORAL STATEMENT AND HER POST-MIRANDA WRITTEN STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (THIRD DEPT). ​
Plaintiff’s Decedent Fell to His Death in a Gorge on Property Owned by Cornell University—Questions of Fact Re: Whether Plaintiff’s Decedent Was “Hiking” within the Meaning of the General Obligations Law (which Would Relieve the University of Liability) and Whether the Dangerous Condition Was Open and Obvious
“Total Industrial Disability” Finding Affirmed—Partially Disabled Claimant Was Deemed Unable to Find Work Based Upon His Age, Education and Work History
Rules of Evidence Properly Relaxed to Allow Hearsay In Proceeding to Modify Guardian’s Power to Control the Social Environment of the Incapacitated Person
Failure to Call One of the Parties Who Signed a Drug-Analysis Report Did Not Violate the Confrontation Clause/No Evidence the Party Conducted Any Testing or Analysis
A GRADUATE OF AN ANTIGUA MEDICAL SCHOOL WHO HAD PASSED THE US MEDICAL LICENSING EXAMINATION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO LICENSURE AS A PHYSICIAN’S ASSISTANT IN NEW YORK (THIRD DEPT).
PERSONAL INJURY ACTION BY MOTHER OF A 14-YEAR-OLD KILLED WHEN WORKING ILLEGALLY ON DEFENDANT FARM PROPERLY DISMISSED; THE RECOVERY UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW WAS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY BECAUSE THE INTENTIONAL-TORT EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY; THE ACTION WAS PRECLUDED BY THE RES JUDICATA DOCTRINE; IN ADDITION THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANTS ACTED WILLFULLY OR INTENTIONALLY (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Ruling that Subject Child Could Not Visit Father in the Presence of Father’s... Question of Fact Whether Negligent Supervision Was the Proximate Cause of the...