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Police Vehicles Are Excluded from the Meaning of “Motor Vehicle” in the Insurance Law—Passenger-Police-Officer Injured In a Police Vehicle by an Uninsured/Underinsured Driver Is Not Covered Under the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Provision of the Police-Officer-Driver’s Personal Policy

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over a dissent, determined that a police vehicle is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Insurance Law. Therefore a police officer, who was injured in a police vehicle driven by another police officer, could not recover under the police-officer-driver’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in the driver’s personal insurance policy:

… Insurance Law §§ 3420 (e) and 3420 (f) (1) do not directly define “motor vehicle” in so many words, but Insurance Law § 3420 (e) does refer to “a motor vehicle or a vehicle as defined in [VTL 388 (2)].” VTL 388 is the sole provision of VTL article 11, which governs civil liability for negligence in the operation of vehicles. VTL 388 (2) states, “As used in this section, ‘vehicle’ means a ‘motor vehicle’, as defined in [VTL 125], except fire and police vehicles,” and certain other vehicles not relevant here (see VTL 388 [2]).  * * *

… [B]ecause the liability insurance provision of Insurance Law § 3420 (e) had traditionally dovetailed with the coverage of VTL 388 and its predecessors, Insurance Law § 3420 (e) employed the phrase “of a motor vehicle or of a vehicle as defined in [VTL 388]” as an imprecise way of incorporating the limitations of VTL 388 into Insurance Law § 3420 (e). In other words, Insurance Law § 3420 (e) used VTL 388 (2) to redefine “motor vehicle” as exempting police vehicles from the automobile insurance sections of Insurance Law § 3420. Given that the uninsured motorist and SUM coverage sections of Insurance Law § 3420 had originated as outgrowths designed to simply fill the uninsured or underinsured motorist “gaps” in the compulsory insurance statute and Insurance Law § 3420 (e), rather than to expand the class of covered vehicles, the Court rightly decided that Insurance Law §§ (f) (1) and (f) (2) logically applied to the limited category of “motor vehicles” referenced in Insurance Law § 3420 (e), thus also excluding police vehicles. Since SUM coverage under Insurance Law § 3420 (f) (2) was just a variant of uninsured coverage under subsection (f) (1) of the same statute, the Court appropriately found that SUM coverage was likewise limited to non-police vehicles. Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Fitzgerald, 2015 NY Slip Op 05626, CtApp 7-1-15

 

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