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INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS APPARENTLY INJURED BY HOT COALS LEFT AFTER A FIRE IN A COUNTY PARK; THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the negligent supervision cause of action against the county should not have been dismissed. Apparently infant plaintiff was injured in a county park by hot coals left after a fire:

“While a municipality is not an insurer of the safety of those who use its parks, it does have a duty to maintain its parks in a reasonably safe condition,’ which includes exercising ordinary care in providing an adequate degree of general supervision'” … . Here, the defendants, in moving for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, failed to demonstrate their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Under the circumstances presented here, the evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their summary judgment motion failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they exercised adequate supervision of park visitors’ use of fires and disposal of hot coals … . S.A.P. v County of Westchester, 2020 NY Slip Op 04337, Second Dept 7-29-20

 

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