You are here: / / Townhouse Residents, Members of a Community Homeowners’ Association,...
,

Townhouse Residents, Members of a Community Homeowners’ Association, Entered an Implied Contract to Pay a Proportionate Share of the Fees for Authorized and Necessary Services in Connection with the Maintenance of the Townhouse Facilities

The Third Department affirmed Supreme Court’s ruling that defendants (townhouse residents) had entered an implied contract to pay a proportionate share of the full cost of maintaining the facilities. The defendants had refused to pay membership fees after a dispute with other residents arose.  The Third Department, applying the “business judgment rule,” determined the fees assessed by the plaintiffs were for authorized and necessary services provided by the plaintiff:

… [T]he Court of Appeals has made clear that an implied contract for a community homeowners’ association “includes the obligation to pay a proportionate share of the full cost of maintaining . . . facilities and services, not merely the reasonable value of those actually used by any particular resident” … . We review plaintiff’s action in undertaking such expenditures under the business judgment rule, which, in the absence of “claims of fraud, self-dealing, unconscionability, or other misconduct,” is limited to an inquiry of “whether the action was authorized and whether it was taken in good faith and in furtherance of the legitimate interests of the corporation” … . Bluff Point Townhouse Owners Assn., Inc. v Kapsokefalos, 2015 NY Slip Op 04905, 3rd Dept 6-11-15

 

You might also like
THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST “ASSISTED LIVING” AS OPPOSED TO “RESIDENTIAL HEALTH CARE” FACILITIES; COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMSSED (THIRD DEPT).
Failure to Meet One-Year Residency Requirement Invalidated Designating Petition
Arbitrator Did Not Have the Authority (CPLR 7511) to Modify an Award by Adding Interest, Even If Interest Should Have Been Awarded as a Matter of Law
WAIVER OF APPEAL DID NOT PRECLUDE CONSIDERATION OF AN ISSUE WHICH AROSE AFTER THE WAIVER, AT SENTENCING ALL WERE UNDER THE MISCONCEPTION DEFENDANT WAS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER, SENTENCING JUDGE HAD SINCE BECOME THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE COULD NOT, THEREFORE, REPRESENT DEFENDANT (THIRD DEPT).
THE INTOXICATED DEFENDANT’S DRIVING WHEN HE FLED FROM THE POLICE, WHILE RECKLESS, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE; DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MURDER CONVICTION NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; CONVICTION REDUCED TO MANSLAUGHTER (THIRD DEPT). ​
AFTER AN INITIAL WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, DEFENDANT BECAME INCREASINGLY UNWILLING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND FINALLY SAID “MAYBE” HE SHOULD GET A LAWYER BECAUSE HE DIDN’T WANT TO INCRIMINATE HIMSELF, FROM THAT POINT ON THE INTERROGATION VIDEO SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (THIRD DEPT).
CLAIMANT’S BEHAVIOR, ALLEGED TO HAVE CONSTITUTED HARASSMENT AND INSUBORDINATION, DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF DISQUALIFYING MISCONDUCT, CLAIMANT WAS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF ALIBI EVIDENCE, COUNTY COURT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE BY PRECLUDING THE ALIBI EVIDENCE; THE UNPRESERVED ERROR WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Presumption, Pursuant to Banking Law 675, that a Joint Bank Account Created... Plaintiff Not Competent When Release Was Signed/Statute of Limitations Tolled...