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Separation and Modification Agreements Did Not Comply with the Child Support Standards Act

The Third Department determined the parties’ separation and modification agreements did not comply with the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA).  The court explained the flaws:

If an agreement or stipulation entered into between the parties “deviates from the basic child support obligation, the agreement or stipulation must specify the amount that such basic child support obligation would have been and the reason or reasons that such agreement or stipulation does not provide for payment of that amount. Such provision may not be waived by either party or counsel” (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [h]…).

Here, the original separation and settlement agreement indicated that the parties had been advised of the provisions of the CSSA and that the amount of child support calculated in compliance therewith would be presumptively valid; the agreement further set forth the applicable statutory percentage for three children (29%) and the parties’ respective incomes and indicated that the husband’s child support obligation would be adjusted upon the cessation of the agreed-upon maintenance payments (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [b] [5] [vii] [C]). The agreement did not, however, indicate what the presumptive amount of child support would be, nor did it set forth the reasons for deviating therefrom. Similar deficiencies exist with respect to the provisions governing the parties’ pro rata share of childcare and medical expenses and, to our analysis, none of the foregoing deficiencies was cured by the subsequent modification agreement. Although the modification agreement acknowledged a departure from the presumptive pro rata share of each party’s childcare expenses and purported to explain the basis for the deviation therefrom, the agreement was silent as to what the presumptive pro rata percentages would be under the CSSA and failed to set forth the income and other financial data supporting the basis for such deviation. Malone v Malone, 2014 NY Slip Op 08281, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

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