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Murder Conviction Against the Weight of the Evidence—Strangulation Was the Result of an Attempt to Increase Sexual Pleasure—No Intent to Kill

The Second Department determined that defendant’s conviction for intentional murder was against the weight of the evidence.  The victim died of strangulation, but the defendant’s actions were motivated by the desire to increase sexual pleasure, not by an intent to kill.  People v Davis, 2014 NY Slip Op 03277, 2nd Dept 5-7-14

 

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