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“Special Employee” Status Defined

Finding that the defendant company had not demonstrated as a matter of law that plaintiff was a “special employee” within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law, the Second Department explained:

The protection against lawsuits brought by injured workers which is afforded to employers by Workers’ Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29(6) extends to special employers … . Thus, an injured person who elects to receive Workers’ Compensation benefits from his or her general employer is barred from maintaining a personal injury action against his or her special employer …. “A special employee is described as one who is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another. General employment is presumed to continue, but this presumption is overcome upon clear demonstration of surrender of control by the general employer and assumption of control by the special employer” …. The determination of special employment status is usually a question of fact and may only be made as a “matter of law where the particular, undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact” … . “Although no one [factor] is decisive,’ the question of who controls and directs the manner, details and ultimate result of the employee’s work’ is a significant and weighty feature’ of the analysis” …. The exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law also extend to entities which are alter egos of the injured worker’s employer ….  Abreu v Wel-Made Enters, Inc, 2013 NY Slip 02524, 2012-03166, Index No 36405/07, 2nd Dept 4-17-13

 

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Denial of Receipt of Service Mandates a Hearing  No “Special Employee” Relationship