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Statutory Presumption of Possession of Weapons Recovered from Vehicle Confers on Vehicle-Occupants Automatic Standing to Move to Suppress

The First Department determined the People were relying exclusively on the statutory presumption that weapons recovered from inside a vehicle are possessed by all the occupants.  Therefore, the defendant had standing to move to suppress the weapons:

In opposition to defendant’s assertion that the weapon possession charges were based solely on the statutory presumption that weapons recovered from the interior of an automobile are deemed to be possessed by all its occupants (Penal Law § 265.15[3]), the People failed to “point to evidence reasonably tending to show the defendant’s actual or constructive possession” of the two pistols … . Instead, the People asserted that the statutory presumption did not apply, claiming erroneously that the two handguns at issue were recovered from the person of one of the car’s passengers (see Penal Law § 265.15[3][a]). The People concede on appeal that this argument was incorrect, because the two pistols (unlike a revolver found on the person of a passenger) were in fact recovered from a box on the back seat. There is no indication that the motion court relied either on the grand jury minutes or the search warrant affidavit. Because the People failed to adequately demonstrate that the charges relating to the two pistols were not based entirely on the statutory presumption, defendant had automatic standing to challenge seizure of those weapons … . People v Rivera, 2015 NY Slip Op 03396, 1st Dept 4-23-15

 

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