Juror Had Personal/Professional Relationships with Two Prosecution Witnesses—For Cause Challenge Should Have Been Granted
The Third Department determined the defendant’s conviction must be reversed because a juror had personal/professional relationships with two of the prosecution witnesses and defendant’s for cause challenge to the juror was denied:
A juror whose relationship with a potential witness is so close “that it is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict” (CPL 270.20 [1] [c]) must be excused even if the juror states that he or she can be impartial, because “the risk of prejudice arising out of the close relationship . . . [is] so great that recital of an oath of impartiality could not convincingly dispel the taint” … . In determining whether a relationship is so close as to require disqualification, a court should consider factors “such as the frequency, recency or currency of the contact, whether it was direct contact, . . . the nature of the relationship as personal and/or professional . . . [and] any facet of the relationship likely to preclude the prospective juror from being impartial” … . As to the first witness, a former working relationship, without more, will not necessarily give rise to implied bias requiring disqualification … . Here, however, the juror described the relationship as more than merely professional; he stated that he knew the witness well, had discussed many subjects with him, had strong feelings about him and tended to believe him, and he volunteered that he was concerned as to whether the relationship would affect his judgment. The juror’s longstanding social relationship with the second witness was sufficiently close that the witness was aware that the juror had been called to jury duty on the case he had investigated, and sufficiently current that the juror and witness had spoken only a few days before the trial. Thus, this relationship, like that with the first witness, “was far more than a ‘nodding acquaintance'” … . Failure to excuse the juror could have “create[d] the perception that the accused might not receive a fair trial before an impartial finder of fact” … . Accordingly, based upon these two relationships, defendant’s challenge for cause should have been granted. People v Hamilton, 2015 NY Slip Op 02804, 3rd Dept 4-2-15