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Board of Commissioner’s Rejection of Hearing Officer’s Award of Supplemental Benefits Was Supported by Substantial Evidence—“Substantial Evidence” Defined and Review Criteria Explained

The Second Department determined the Board of Commissioners of the Greenville Fire District properly rejected a hearing officer’s recommendation that the petitioner be awarded supplemental benefits pursuant to the General Municipal Law. The court explained its review powers and the evidentiary requirements:

“Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required by law is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence” … . “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla of evidence,’ and the test of whether substantial evidence exists in a record is one of rationality, taking into account all the evidence on both sides” … . “When there is conflicting evidence or different inferences may be drawn, the duty of weighing the evidence and making the choice rests solely upon the [administrative agency]. The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [such agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists'” … . “Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 20-a determination, a municipality is free to credit one physician’s testimony over that of another'” … . “Thus, even if conflicting medical evidence can be found in the record,’ the municipality’s determination, based on its own expert’s conclusions, may still be supported by substantial evidence” … .

Here, the determination of the Board of Commissioners of the Greenville Fire District (hereinafter the Board), which rejected the recommendation of a hearing officer and denied the petitioner’s application for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a(2), was supported by substantial evidence … . The Board was entitled to make a finding contrary to the hearing officer’s recommendation, as long as substantial evidence supported the determination … . The Board was free to credit the expert of the Greenville Fire District (hereinafter the Fire District) over the petitioner’s expert, as it did, so long as testimony of the Fire District’s expert was consistent and supported by the medical evidence … . Since the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, we confirm the determination and deny that branch of the petition which was to annul the determination … . Matter of Delgrande v Greenville Fire Dist., 2015 NY Slip Op 02474, 2nd Dept 3-25-15

 

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