You are here: / / Question of Fact Whether Failure to Wear a Harness Precluded Recovery in...

Question of Fact Whether Failure to Wear a Harness Precluded Recovery in a Labor Law 240 (1) Action

The Second Department determined defendant had raised a question of fact whether plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident (which would preclude recovery in a Labor Law 240 (1) action).  Plaintiff was injured when plywood flooring collapsed. However the defendant presented evidence plaintiff was aware he was required to wear a harness which would have prevented him from falling to the floor below:

” Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites'” … . To prevail on a cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), the plaintiff must establish a violation of the statute and that the violation was a proximate cause of his injuries … . Although contributory negligence on the part of the worker is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim …, where a plaintiff’s actions are the sole proximate cause of his injuries, liability under Labor Law § 240(1) does not attach … .

Here, although the plaintiff met his prima facie burden of establishing a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) … the defendants produced evidence that a safety harness and line were available to the plaintiff, that he was aware that he was required to anchor the line on the floor where he was working, and that the anchors, harness, and line would have prevented him from falling to the 14th floor, but that the plaintiff had consciously decided not to anchor his line on the 15th floor as instructed. The defendant’s submissions were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of his accident … . Bascombe v West 44th St Hotel LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 00712, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

You might also like
Plaintiff’s Alleging a Deed Executed Within the Ten-Year Statute of Limitations for Adverse Possession Is Void Creates a Presumption of Possession by the Plaintiff Within the Ten-Year Period
HOMEOWNER’S EXCEPTION APPLIED TO HOMEOWNER BUT NOT TO AGENT OF HOMEOWNER WHO SUPERVISED THE WORK.
QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE ADVERSE POSSESSION ACTION AND THE LACHES DEFENSE, THE ACTION INVOLVED LAND THAT WAS ONCE UNDER WATER CREATED BY THE MOVEMENT OF SAND DURING STORMS DECADES AGO (SECOND DEPT).
WHEN A PRIOR MOTION HAS BEEN DENIED ON PROCEDURAL GOUNDS “WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RENEW,” THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RENEW THE PRIOR MOTION DOES NOT HAVE TO BE SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESENTING NEW FACTS (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK’S PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS INSUFFICIENT; THE BUSINESS RECORDS REFERRED TO IN THE AFFIDAVIT WERE NOT PRODUCED (SECOND DEPT).
Statutory 9% Interest Rate, Not Contractual 18% Rate, Should Have Been Applied to Breach of Contract Damages (Even Though the Monthly Payments Were Deposited in an Escrow Account During Litigation)
DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE WATER ON THE FLOOR WHERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY SLIPPED AND FELL; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE RECORD ON APPEAL DID NOT SUPPORT FAMILY COURT’S RULING MOTHER HAD FORFEITED HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Criteria for Collateral Estoppel Explained (Criteria Not Met Here) Cause of Action Based Upon a Legal Theory Which Could Have Been Raised in a...