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Regulation Prohibiting/Restricting Smoking in New York Parks Properly Promulgated by Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation—“Boreali” Criteria Explained and Applied to the Facts in Some Depth

Reversing Supreme Court, the Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Peters, determined that a regulation prohibiting/restricting smoking in New York parks was properly promulgated by the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation (OPRHP).  Petitioner, an organization promoting the interests of smokers, argued the agency did not have the authority to regulate smoking in parks absent legislation on the issue and, therefore, the promulgation of the rule violated the principle of separation of powers.  The court explained the “Boreali” criteria under which the regulation was analyzed and applied the criteria to the facts (the interesting, detailed, fact-specific analysis is not summarized here):

Respondents, the Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation (hereinafter OPRHP) and its Commissioner, are empowered by statute to “[o]perate and maintain . . . historic sites and objects, parks, parkways and recreational facilities”(PRHPL 3.09 [2]) and to “[p]rovide for the health, safety and welfare of the public using facilities under its jurisdiction” (PRHPL 3.09 [5]). In February 2013, pursuant to this statutory authority, OPRHP adopted a rule establishing smoke-free areas in certain limited outdoor locations under its jurisdiction (see 9 NYCRR 386.1). Such regulation, among other things, also prohibits smoking in each state park located in New York City, with limited exceptions (see 9 NYCRR 386.1 [a] [2])… . OPRHP announced that this rule was needed in order to allow “patrons to enjoy the outdoors, breathe fresh air, walk, swim, exercise and experience [s]tate [p]arks' amenities and programs without being exposed to secondhand tobacco smoke and tobacco litter” (NY Reg Dec. 5, 2012 at 11). * * *

“The cornerstone of administrative law is derived from the principle that the Legislature may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, endow administrative agencies with the power to fill in the interstices in the legislative product by prescribing rules and regulations consistent with the enabling legislation” (…see NY Const, art III, § 1). As the Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed, when determining whether an administrative agency has violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers, we must consider the “coalescing circumstances” set forth in Boreali v Axelrod (71 NY2d 1, 11 [1987]), namely, (1) whether the respondents improperly engaged in the balancing of their stated goal with competing social concerns and acted “solely on [their] own ideas of sound public policy”; (2) whether the respondents engaged in the “interstitial” rulemaking typical of administrative agencies or instead “wrote on a clean slate, creating [their] own comprehensive set of rules without benefit of legislative guidance”; (3) whether the challenged regulation concerns “an area in which the Legislature ha[s] repeatedly tried — and failed — to reach agreement in the face of substantial public debate and vigorous lobbying by a variety of interested factions”; and (4) whether the respondents overstepped their bounds because the development of the regulation did not require the exercise of expertise or technical competence by the administrative agency (id. at 12-14 …). In determining whether “the difficult-to-define line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-making has been transgressed,” this Court should view these circumstances “in combination” (Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d at 11), while ever mindful that “'it is the province of the people's elected representatives, rather than appointed administrators, to resolve difficult social problems by making choices among competing ends'” … .

Applying the four Boreali considerations, we find no usurpation of the Legislature's prerogative by respondents' promulgation of 9 NYCRR 386.1. Matter of NYC C.L.A.S.H. Inc v New York State Off of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preserv, 2014 NY Slip Op 09085, 3rd Dept 12-31-14


 

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