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Contract Giving Plaintiff Option to Sell the Property Back to the Defendants If Rezoning Not Obtained Was Ambiguous About When the Option Must Be Exercised Raising a Question of Fact About the Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Exercise of the Option

The Second Department determined the contract rider which allowed plaintiff-purchaser to sell the property back to the defendants-sellers if rezoning and subdivision approvals were not obtained within 15 months was an option contract.  The defendants argued that the option must be exercised within a reasonable time and the plaintiff’s failure to do so entitled defendants to summary judgment.  Supreme Court disagreed and granted plaintiff summary judgment (specific performance). The Second Department found that the contract was ambiguous concerning the time within which the option must be exercised, raising a triable question of fact:

An option contract is an agreement to hold an offer open; it confers upon the optionee, for consideration paid, the right to purchase–—or, less commonly, to sell –at a later date … . Whether an agreement is an option contract or a bilateral contract is determined by reference to its various terms … .

Here, as the defendants correctly contend, section 8(a) of the rider to the subject contract giving the plaintiff the right to sell the property back to [the defendants if plaintiff] failed to obtain certain rezoning and subdivision approvals was an option contract, as it conferred upon the plaintiff the right to sell the property back to Fairview at a later date.

However, in order for there to be an enforceable contract for the sale of land upon which an action for specific performance can be based, an optionee must exercise an option in accordance with its terms, within the time and the manner specified in the option … .

Here, the plaintiff interprets the option contained in section 8(a) of the rider as providing it with an open-ended right to exercise same, and the Supreme Court agreed. The defendants, however, interpret the same provision as limiting the plaintiff’s time to exercise the option to “a reasonable time” after the expiration of the aforementioned 15-month period in which to obtain the specified rezoning and subdivision approvals, and contend that the plaintiff failed to timely exercise its rights.

“Contract language which is clear and unambiguous must be enforced according to its terms” … . However, ambiguity in a written agreement exists if there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the language at issue … . The test for determining whether contract language is ambiguous is “whether the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation” … . Whether an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the court … . Here, we conclude that section 8(a) of the rider is ambiguous and subject to more than one interpretation regarding the time within which the plaintiff had to exercise the option. Since a triable issue of fact exists as to the intention of the parties, the Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the cause of action for specific performance … . IPE Asset Mgt LLC v Fairview Block & Supply Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 08811, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

 

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