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AUTO REPAIR SHOP OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO HAD BORROWED THE CAR WHICH HAD BEEN REPAIRED FOR THE OWNER, SINCE NO ESPINAL FACTORS WERE ALLEGED DEFENDANT REPAIR SHOP DID NOT NEED TO NEGATE THOSE FACOTRS IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant auto repair shop (Auto Excellence) did not owe a duty to plaintiff who was injured driving a borrowed car. Plaintiff, who alleged the car was negligently repaired (causing injury), did not have a contractual relationship with the repair shop and did not allege any Espinal factors which could give rise to tort liability based on a contract. Because no Espinal factors were alleged there was no need for defendant to negate those factors in its motion papers:

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A contractual obligation, standing alone, generally will not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party … , the Court of Appeals recognized that exceptions to this rule apply (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his or her duties, launches a force or instrument of harm, (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties, and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced another party’s duty, in Espinal, to maintain the premises safely.

Here, Auto Excellence made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by offering proof that the plaintiff was not a party to the repair contract and, thus, Auto Excellence owed her no duty of care … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, since the pleadings did not allege facts which would establish the applicability of any of the Espinal exceptions, Auto Excellence was not required to affirmatively demonstrate that these exceptions did not apply in order to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … . Koslosky v Malmut, 2017 NY Slip Op 02977, 2nd Dept 4-19-17

NEGLIGENCE (AUTO REPAIR SHOP OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO HAD BORROWED THE CAR WHICH HAD BEEN REPAIRED BY THE OWNER, SINCE NO ESPINAL FACTORS WERE ALLEGED DEFENDANT REPAIR SHOP DID NOT NEED TO NEGATE THOSE FACTORS IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/CONTRACT LAW (TORT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTY, (AUTO REPAIR SHOP OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO HAD BORROWED THE CAR WHICH HAD BEEN REPAIRED BY THE OWNER, SINCE NO ESPINAL FACTORS WERE ALLEGED DEFENDANT REPAIR SHOP DID NOT NEED TO NEGATE THOSE FACTORS IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ESPINAL FACTORS, (AUTO REPAIR SHOP OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO HAD BORROWED THE CAR WHICH HAD BEEN REPAIRED BY THE OWNER, SINCE NO ESPINAL FACTORS WERE ALLEGED DEFENDANT REPAIR SHOP DID NOT NEED TO NEGATE THOSE FACTORS IN ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

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