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Denial of Pistol Permit Application Was Based Upon a Misinterpretation of Penal Law 400.00

The Third Department determined County Court had based its denial of petitioner’s pistol permit application upon a misreading of Penal Law 400.00.  County Court interpreted the statute to mean that the prior revocation of a pistol permit for any reason rendered the petitioner ineligible.  However, the statute should have been interpreted to refer only to prior revocations pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 530.14 and Family Court Act 842-a:

Respondent denied petitioner’s pistol permit application based upon Penal Law § 400.00 (1) (k) (formerly Penal Law § 400.00 [1] [e]), finding that petitioner was ineligible for a pistol permit because of the prior revocation of his permit. Penal Law § 400.00 (1) (k) provides that no permit may be issued to an individual “who has [] had a license revoked or who is [] under a suspension or ineligibility order issued pursuant to the provisions of [CPL] 530.14 . . . or [Family Ct Act § 842-a].” Respondent interpreted this statute as two separate clauses and automatically barred petitioner from being issued a permit because his license had previously been revoked, despite the fact that the revocation was unrelated to either CPL 530.14 or Family Ct Act § 842-a.

We agree with petitioner that this was erroneous, as our reading of the statute indicates that the bar to issuance of a pistol permit “applies only in conjunction with the application of the Criminal Procedure Law and Family Court Act sections cited therein, which deal with orders of protection, and provides that a person who has previously had a firearms license revoked pursuant to those sections is ineligible to hold such a license”… .  * * *

Although the revocation of petitioner’s pistol permit and the reasons therefor unquestionably could have some bearing on whether there is “good cause” to deny his current application (Penal Law § 400.00 [1] [n]), respondent’s denial of the application was based, not on a finding of “good cause” but, rather, upon respondent’s misinterpretation of Penal Law § 400 (1) (k). Matter of Gerard v Koweek, 2014 NY Slip Op 08084, 3rd Dept 11-20-14

 

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