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Relationship Between the “Open Repudiation [of Fiduciary Obligations] Rule” and the Laches Defense Explained/Allegations that Investments Made by the Fiduciary Underperformed Does Not State a Cause of Action for Breach of the Fiduciary Duty

In reversing Surrogate’s Court’s dismissal of objections to the fiduciary’s final accounting based on the laches defense, the Fourth Department explained the “open repudiation rule” and its relationship to laches.  To take advantage of the laches defense, the fiduciary must have openly repudiated his or her obligation or there must have been a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account, niether of which took place here.  The Fourth Department reached the same result as did Surrogate’s Court by concluding, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), that the numerous specific objections failed to state any cause of action against the fiduciary.  With respect to the “open repudiation rule” and the “underperforming investments” allegations, the court wrote:

… [T]he open repudiation rule applies to the defense of laches … . As the Court of Appeals stated in Barabash, “[a] fiduciary is not entitled to rely upon the laches of his beneficiary as a defense, unless he repudiates the relation to the knowledge of the beneficiary” … . Moreover, the open repudiation rule “requires proof of a repudiation by the fiduciary which is clear and made known to the beneficiaries” … . * * * Inasmuch as petitioner’s repudiation of its role of fiduciary was a prerequisite to its assertion of the defense of laches, and because no such repudiation occurred, we conclude that the Surrogate erred in permitting petitioner to assert that defense and in dismissing the objections on the ground that the objections were barred thereby. * * *

The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are ” the existence of a fiduciary duty, misconduct by the [fiduciary] and damages that were directly caused by the [fiduciary’s] misconduct’ ” … . * * *

We reject objectants’ contention that they stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty by filing an objection to petitioner’s refusal to consider investment in nonproprietary funds. Objectants correctly concede that the Prudent Investor Act permits petitioner to invest trust assets in proprietary funds (see EPTL 11-2.3 [d]). The Prudent Investor Act also requires a trustee such as petitioner with “special investment skills” to “exercise such diligence in investing and managing assets as would customarily be exercised by prudent investors of discretion and intelligence having special investment skills” (EPTL 11-2.3 [b] [6]). Even under this standard, however, ” it is not sufficient that hindsight might suggest that another course would have been more beneficial; nor does a mere error of investment judgment mandate a surcharge’ ” … . Thus, it is well settled that ” a fiduciary’s conduct is not judged strictly by the success or failure of the investment . . . In short, the test is prudence, not performance, and therefore evidence of losses following the investment decision does not, by itself, establish imprudence’ ” … . Here, objectants merely alleged that the proprietary funds were underperforming, which is insufficient to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty … . Matter of JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, 2014 NY Slip Op 07799, 4th Dept 11-14-14

 

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