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THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD RULED THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE “POST-CONCUSSION SYNDROME” OR A “CONCUSSION CONDITION;” PLAINTIFF WAS THEREFORE ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THOSE INJURIES IN THIS LABOR LAW ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the ruling by the Workers’ Compensation Board that plaintiff did not have “post-concussion syndrome” or a “concussion condition” collaterally estopped plaintiff from claiming those injuries in this Labor Law action:

We agree with defendant that the court erred in denying its motion insofar as it effectively sought summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims for damages related to PCS or a concussion condition as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, but we conclude that plaintiff’s claims for damages related to headaches and the alleged concussion itself are not so barred. The quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies, such as the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), “are entitled to collateral estoppel effect where the issue a party seeks to preclude in a subsequent civil action is identical to a material issue that was necessarily decided by the administrative tribunal and where there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate before that tribunal” … and a determination whether a plaintiff actually sustained a physical injury causally related to an accident … , the Board in this case specifically found that plaintiff did not have “post-concussion syndrome” or a “concussion condition” that were causally related to the second work accident. Szymkowiak v New York Power Auth., 2022 NY Slip Op 01702, Fourth Dept 3-11-22

Practice Point: Here the Workers’ Compensation Board’s ruling plaintiff did not have “post-concussion syndrome” or a “concussion condition” precluded claims for those injuries in the plaintiff’s Labor Law action pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

 

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