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Doctrine of Primary Assumption of the Risk Does Not Apply to Game of “Manhunt” Played After Midnight on School Property

The Second Department determined that a game of “Manhunt” played on school premises after midnight was not the type of activity covered by the primary assumption of the risk doctrine:

…[T]he defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk … , the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is most persuasively justified for its utility in facilitating ” free and vigorous participation in athletic activities'” … . As the Court of Appeals explained in Trupia v Lake George Cent. School Dist. (14 NY3d 392), by placing the risk of participation on the participants themselves, rather than on the sponsor, the doctrine encourages sponsorship, which leads to more participation … . The doctrine of primary assumption of risk is not applicable to the midnight game of manhunt at issue in this case. As with the “horseplay” at issue in Trupia, the game of manhunt at issue in this case is not the sort of “socially valuable voluntary activity” that the doctrine seeks to encourage … . Therefore, the defendant did not establish that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies here … . Wolfe v North Merrick Union Free School Dist, 2014 NY Slip Op 07499, 2nd Dept 11-5-14

 

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