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THE PURCHASERS BREACHED THE CONTRACT OF SALE BY INFORMING THE SELLER THEY WOULD NOT ATTEND THE “TIME OF THE ESSENCE” CLOSING; THEREFORE THE PURCHASERS ARE ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THEIR DEPOSIT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the seller did not breach the contract for sale and the purchasers breached the contract by stating in a letter they would not attend the “time of the essence” closing. Therefore the purchasers were entitled to the return of their deposit:

The Supreme Court erred in determining that the purchasers were entitled to a return of their down payment because the seller breached the contract by failing to “close on the property free of violations.” Instead, the purchasers never placed the seller in default. * * *

… [A]s the purchasers advised by letter prior to the “time of the essence” closing that they would not appear at the closing, they breached the contract and forfeited their down payment, without the necessity of a tender on the part of the seller … . Xelo v Hamilton, 2021 NY Slip Op 05364, Second Dept 10-6-21

 

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