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Damages for “Loss of Fetus” Under Insurance Law 5102 Are Not Available When the Baby Is Born Alive

The Second Department determined that the “loss of fetus” provision of Insurance Law 5102 did not apply to the birth of a live child allegedly induced by a car accident:

[Plaintiff] was pregnant at the time of the accident, and she alleges that she suffered a placental abruption which caused her son, the infant plaintiff, to be born prematurely and delivered by caesarean section. * * *

The defendants subsequently moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged that [plaintiff], individually, sustained a serious injury under the “loss of a fetus” category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident * * *. …[T]he Supreme Court concluded, in essence, that the phrase “loss of a fetus” encompassed any termination of a pregnancy caused by an accident, regardless of whether the fetus was born alive.

In cases involving statutory construction, legislative intent is the controlling principle … . “The Court’s threshold inquiry in this regard is how to discern the legislative intent. When an enactment displays a plain meaning, the courts construe the legislatively chosen words so as to give effect to that Branch’s utterance” … . Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the plain meaning of the term “loss of a fetus” does not include the premature birth of a living child. Rather, this category of damages is applicable where, as a result of an automobile accident, a viable pregnancy terminates with loss of the fetus … .

We note that this determination is consistent with legislative history, which reveals that the “loss of a fetus” category was added to Insurance Law § 5102(d) in 1984 in response to Raymond v Bartsch (84 AD2d 60). In that case, the Appellate Division, [3rd] Department, held that Insurance Law § 5102(d), as then constituted, did not permit a woman, who was nine months pregnant at the time of her accident, to recover damages resulting from her delivery of a stillborn baby. The “loss of a fetus” category was added to the statute in recognition that “[a] woman who is involved in an automobile accident that results in the termination of her pregnancy has suffered a serious injury and should have the right to recover from a negligent operator for her non-economic loss” (Sponsor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1984, ch 143). The policy considerations underlying the 1984 amendment of Insurance Law § 5102(d) are not implicated when a child is born alive. Leach v Ocean Black Car Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 07477, 2nd Dept 11-5-14

 

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