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Vehicle On a Flatbed Tow Truck Is Not In “Use or Operation” Within Meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law 388

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court finding that the owner (Rosa) of a vehicle which is on a flatbed tow truck when the truck is involved in an accident cannot no be liable under Vehicle and Traffic Law 388:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) imposes liability on all vehicle owners for accidents resulting from negligence in the permissive “use or operation” of their vehicles, including use “in combination with one another, by attachment or tow” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388[1]…). The statute’s primary objective is ” to provide recourse to an injured party against a person, financially able to respond, without whose conduct in permitting use of the vehicle the accident would not have happened'” … .

Here, Rosa’s vehicle was not in use at the time of the accident, either on its own or in combination with the flatbed tow truck… . Rather, it was merely cargo on the flatbed tow truck. Gibson v Sing Towinf Inc, 2014 Slip Op 03483, 2nd Dept 5-14-14

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