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Where Jail Time Is Contemplated as Punishment for Disobeying an Order of Protection, the Standard of Proof for Willful Contempt is “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lahtinen, determined that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applied in a contempt proceeding where jail time was imposed as a punishment for disobeying an order of protection.  The court held the proof met the standard, but sentenced the respondent to time-served (11 days):

Case law has not been consistent regarding the level of proof when considering an alleged willful violation of a protective order … . This inconsistency may be due in part to the statutory silence as to the quantum of proof (see Family Ct Act § 846-a [stating that the court must be satisfied by “competent proof”]), as well as the fact that, like other statutes implicating contempt, a Family Ct Act article 8 proceeding can involve civil contempt, criminal contempt or both. Criminal and civil contempt have different levels of proof as “criminal contempt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” whereas “civil contempt . . . must be proven by clear and convincing evidence” … .

Where, as here, a person who has violated an order of protection is incarcerated as a punitive remedy for a definite period — with no avenue to shorten the term by acts that extinguish the contempt — then that aspect of the Family Ct Act article 8 proceeding “is one involving criminal contempt [and] [t]he standard of proof that must be met to establish that the individual willfully violated the court’s order is beyond a reasonable doubt” … . Matter of Stuart LL v Aimee KL, 2014 NY Slip Op 07222, 3rd Dept 10-23-14

 

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