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Election Law Which Restricts Where Certain Candidates’ Names May Appear on the Ballot (Election Law 7-104 (4) (c)) Declared Constitutional

The Third Department determined that Election Law 7-104 (4) (c) was not unconstitutional as applied to petitioners, candidates for state office nominated by the Stop Common Core Party:

Petitioners commenced this proceeding seeking a declaration that Election Law § 7-104 (4) (c) is unconstitutional as applied to them because it violates their rights to freedom of speech and association guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the US Constitution. Although petitioners did not dispute that respondents complied with section 7-104 (4) (c), they asserted that strict enforcement of that provision creates a patch-worked and illogical ballot that promotes voter confusion, makes it more difficult for Stop Common Core Party supporters to locate petitioners, and impinges upon petitioners’ right to associate and express themselves as a party slate of candidates who share common ideals. Petitioners further sought to compel respondents to place their names on the Stop Common Core Party line … . * * *

[In overruling the line of cases relied upon by the petitioners, the] Court [of Appeals] …  stated that the prior version of the statute — which is not meaningfully distinct from the present version before us (see Election Law former § 248) — “is clear and constitutional” … . Addressing its prior cases … which found a strict application of the statute to be unfair and prejudicial in cases similar to this one, the Court stated that “‘[u]nfair and prejudicial’ must mean something beyond detriment or inconvenience since the Legislature itself has said that fairness calls for the prohibition of a third column” to candidates nominated by independent bodies when those candidates already appear on the ballot as the nominees of two or more major parties (Matter of Battista v Power, 16 NY2d at 201). The Court clarified that “[t]he kind of unfairness and prejudice which would make the section unconstitutional as to a particular group must be of such character as to deprive that group of proper representation on the voting machine or otherwise make it practically impossible for the members of that group to vote as such” (id.).

In our view, Matter of Battista v Power (supra) is controlling, particularly after the Court of Appeals expressly indicated that it had overruled the last of the prior, inconsistent line of cases …. Under Battista, Election Law § 7-104 (4) (c) is not unconstitutional as applied to petitioners—their names appear twice on the ballot in separate major party lines and the ballot further designates them as candidates of the Stop Common Core Party, albeit in a less prominent fashion than they seek … . Matter of Cahill v Kellner, 2014 NY Slip Op 06886, 3rd Dept 10-10-14

 

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