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Criteria for Setting Aside a Verdict As a Matter of Law and Setting Aside a Verdict As Against the Weight of the Evidence Explained

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff after a jury verdict in favor of the defendant.  The facts were such that the jury could have found fault on the part of the plaintiff and the defendant, but the jury could not have found the defendant was free from fault.  Therefore, the trial court should not have directed a verdict for the plaintiff, but rather should have found the verdict against the weight of the evidence and ordered a new trial.  The Second Department explained the different criteria for setting aside a verdict as a matter of law and setting aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence:

CPLR 4404(a) provides, in relevant part, that: “[a]fter a trial of a cause of action or issue triable of right by a jury, upon the motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court may set aside a verdict or any judgment entered thereon and direct that judgment be entered in favor of a party entitled to judgment as a matter of law or it may order a new trial of a cause of action or separable issue where the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence” (CPLR 4404[a]). The Court of Appeals has recognized that the setting aside of a jury verdict as a matter of law and the setting aside of a jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence involve two inquiries and two different standards … . For a court to conclude as a matter of law that a jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence, it must find that there is “simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead . . . to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” … . However, “[w]hether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors” … . ” When a verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view'” … . “A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence” … . Thus, rationality is the touchstone for legal sufficiency, while fair interpretation is the criterion for weight of the evidence … . Where a court makes a finding that a jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence, it “leads to a directed verdict terminating the action without resubmission of the case to a jury” … . Where a court finds that a jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence, it grants a new trial … . Ramirez v Mezzacappa, 2014 NY Slip Op 06808, 2nd Dept 10-8-14

 

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