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The Language of the NYC Rent Control Law, Unlike the Language of the NYC Rent Stabilization Law, Does Not Allow “Luxury Deregulation” After the Expiration of J-51 Tax Benefits

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Sweeny, determined that the relevant provision of the NYC Rent and Rehabilitation Act (Rent Control Law or RCL) could not be interpreted to allow “luxury deregulation” of a rent-controlled apartment upon the expiration of “J-51” tax benefits.  “Luxury deregulation” refers to the removal of rent controls where the tenant can afford to pay market rates. The opinion focused upon the wording of the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) versus the wording of the Rent Control Law (RCL) .  The RSL specifically allows the owner of an apartment to apply for luxury deregulation upon the expiration of the J-51 tax benefits, while the RCL (the controlling regulation here) does not.  The opinion includes a discussion of court-review of an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute where specialized knowledge is not involved, and statutory-interpretation criteria:

At the outset, we note that the question before us turns purely on statutory interpretation. As such, we need not defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statutes in question, as we are not called upon “to interpret a statute where specialized knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices or . . . an evaluation of factual data and inferences to be drawn therefrom’ is at stake” … . * * *

The owner argues that the rationale of [the RSL] should also apply to apartments subject to rent control, because, inter alia, to hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the purpose of the luxury deregulation law, which attempted to “restore some rationality to a system which provides the bulk of its benefits to high income tenants” … . We are not unmindful that the legislative history indicates a preference not to have people who can easily afford market value rental property inhabit rent-regulated housing. However, this history does not offer sufficient evidence to alter the unambiguous language of Administrative Code § 26-403(e)(2)(j). To do so would require us to import new language into the RCL and “give it a meaning not otherwise found therein” … . Indeed, “where the language of a statute is clear, there is little room to add to or take away from that meaning'” … . If the application of such long-established principles of statutory construction produces “an undesirable result, the problem is one to be addressed by the Legislature” … . Matter of RAM I LLC v NYS Div of Hous & Community Renewal, 2014 NY Slip Op 06784, 1st Dept 10-7-14

 

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