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Annuity Purchased as Part of Settlement After Husband’s On-the-Job Accident Is Marital Property—Husband’s Pension Is Marital Property to the Extent It Represents Deferred Compensation—Wife Did Not Demonstrate Entitlement to Appreciation of Marital Residence (Which Was Husband’s Separate Property)

After noting that the appellate court has the same powers as the trial court in rendering a judgment in a matrimonial action, the Second Department determined that an annuity purchased pursuant to a settlement agreement stemming from the on-the-job injury to the plaintiff-husband should have been deemed marital, not separate, property.  The Second Department further determined that plaintiff’s pension was marital property subject to equitable distribution, and defendant did not demonstrate she was entitled to any portion of the appreciation of the marital residence (which was plaintiff’s separate property):

Although a settlement award emanating from a personal injury action commenced by the parties is partially the separate property of each party named in such action (…Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d][2]), here, the parties’ conduct converted the separate property of the settlement into marital property. Specifically, the parties’ agreement to a settlement term that allowed the obligor or its successors to purchase an annuity, which provided for a right of survivorship to each party, to effectuate the terms of the settlement, manifests the parties’ intent to transfer the character of the property of each arising out of that settlement from separate to marital. * * *

With respect to the equitable distribution of this marital asset, “it is important to note that there is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be on an equal basis” … . Here, equity dictates that the plaintiff should receive most of the annuity, as he is permanently disabled and unable to earn an income now or in the future, whereas the plaintiff is employed and has future income earning capacity. * * *

The Supreme Court also erred in finding that the plaintiff’s pension payments constituted separate property not subject to equitable distribution (cf. Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][b]). In New York, “pension benefits or vested rights to those benefits, except to the extent that they are earned or acquired before marriage or after commencement of a matrimonial action, constitute marital property” … . To the extent that a disability pension constitutes compensation for personal injuries, it is considered separate property not subject to equitable distribution … . However, to the extent that a disability pension represents deferred compensation, it is subject to equitable distribution … . Thus, here, the defendant is entitled to an equitable share of the marital portion of so much of the plaintiff’s pension as represents deferred compensation … . * * *

…[T]he defendant failed to provide any evidence tending to show an appreciation in the value of the marital residence due to her contributions that would entitle her to an equitable share of the increase in value of the marital property (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d][3]…). The only evidence of the value of the marital residence was the plaintiff’s net worth statement, which indicated that he purchased it for $35,000. The defendant offered no evidence to establish the value of the home at the time of the commencement of the divorce action or whether it had appreciated in value during the marriage. Rizzo v Rizzo, 2014 NY Slip Op 06305, 2nd Dept 9-24-14

 

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