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Firefighter Injured in Apartment Fire Which Stemmed from the Use of a Cooking Stove to Provide Heat Can Sue the Owner of the Apartment House Based Upon the Owner’s Failure to Provide Adequate Heat

The Second Department determined that an injured firefighter had stated a cause of action pursuant to General Municipal Law 205-a against the owner of an apartment building based upon owner’s failure to provide adequate heat in the apartments.  The fire in which the firefighter was injured was started when a child put paper in the open flame of a stove burner which the child’s mother had turned on to provide heat:

… Multiple Dwelling Law § 79 …and Administrative Code of the City of New York § 27-2029, …require …that, between October 1 and May 31, a landlord provide heat sufficient to maintain a temperature of 68 degrees Fahrenheit between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. * * *

General Municipal Law § 205-a affords firefighters and their survivors a statutory cause of action for line-of-duty injuries resulting from negligent noncompliance with the requirements of any governmental statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, and requirements … . “To establish a defendant’s liability under General Municipal Law § 205-a, a plaintiff firefighter must identify the statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply, describe the manner in which the firefighter was injured, and set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm to the firefighter'” … . The statute or ordinance identified must be part of a “well-developed body of law and regulation” that imposes “clear legal duties” or mandates the “performance or nonperformance of specific acts” … .

* * * … [T]he plaintiff made the requisite showing that Multiple Dwelling Law § 79 and Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 27-2029 are part of well-developed bodies of law and regulation that impose clear legal duties, or mandate the performance or nonperformance of specific acts … . Both provisions mandate the performance of specific acts. Moreover, failure to comply with the provisions can result in criminal sanctions (see Multiple Dwelling Law § 304; Administrative Code City of N.Y. § 27-2118[a]). “Where criminal liability may be imposed, we would be hard put to find a more well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties” … . Thus, Multiple Dwelling Law § 79 and Administrative Code § 27-2029 can properly serve as predicates for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-a. Paolicelli v Fieldbridge Assoc LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 05849, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

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