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Attempted Murder and Attempted Robbery Convictions, Under the Facts, Required Concurrent, Not Consecutive, Sentences—Applicable Law Described in Some Depth

The Second Department determined defendant, who was convicted of attempted murder and attempted robbery, must be sentenced to concurrent, not consecutive, terms of imprisonment for those two offenses.  The defendant displayed a handgun and demanded money from the victim.  When the victim refused, the defendant struck and shot the victim:

Penal Law § 70.25(2) provides that concurrent sentences must be imposed “for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other.” “Thus, sentences of imprisonment imposed for two or more offenses may not run consecutively (1) where a single act constitutes two offenses, or (2) where a single act constitutes one of the offenses and a material element of the other” … . However, “trial courts retain consecutive sentence discretion when separate offenses are committed through separate acts, though they are part of a single transaction” … .

Here, consecutive sentences may not be imposed because the act which constituted the offense of attempted murder in the second degree was a material element of the offense of attempted robbery in the first degree. A person is guilty of attempted murder in the second degree when, with intent to commit murder, he or she engages in conduct which tends to cause the death of another person (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25[1]). A person is guilty of attempted robbery in the first degree, under the Penal Law section charged here, when he or she attempts to forcibly steal property and is armed with a deadly weapon (see Penal Law § 160.15[2]). A person forcibly steals when he or she, in the course of committing a larceny, uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property or to compel the owner to deliver the property (see Penal Law § 160.00[1], [2]). Here, the actus reus of the attempted murder charge was the firing of three shots at Moore, and the actus reus of the attempted robbery charge was the use or threatened use of physical force to attempt to steal property while armed with a deadly weapon. The act which constitutes attempted murder in the second degree is subsumed within the element of using force. Thus, the act constituting attempted murder in the second degree can be a material element of attempted robbery in the first degree … .

In addition, the People have failed to establish that the acts constituting the attempted robbery in the first degree were separate and distinct from the acts constituting the attempted murder in the second degree … . Here, consecutive sentences could not be imposed because it is impossible to determine whether the firing of three gun shots at Moore, which formed the basis of the verdict of guilt on the attempted murder charge, was also the use of force which formed the basis of the jury’s verdict of guilt on the attempted robbery charge … . Therefore, the People have failed to establish that the acts constituting attempted robbery in the first degree were separate and distinct from those constituting attempted murder in the second degree. People v Grant, 2014 NY Slip Op 08859, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

 

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