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Written Waiver of Conflict by Defendants Precluded Disqualification of Plaintiff’s Counsel

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court, finding that the motion by the defendants to disqualify plaintiff’s attorney (Brooks) based upon a conflict of interest should have been denied.  The defendants had signed a waiver after full disclosure of the conflict:

” [T]he disqualification of an attorney is a matter which rests within the sound discretion of the court. A party’s entitlement to be represented in ongoing litigation by counsel of his or her own choosing is a valued right which should not be abridged absent a clear showing that disqualification is warranted, and the movant bears the burden on the motion'” … . Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the motion to disqualify Brooks …, as counsel for the plaintiff. Pursuant to the written waiver, the …defendants specifically waived any conflict of interest that might arise from Brooks’s representation of the plaintiff. The waiver fully informed the …defendants of the potential conflict of interest and, by executing the waiver, the … defendants consented to have Brooks represent them notwithstanding that conflict … . Grovick Props LLC v 83-10 Astoria Blvd LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 05627, 2nd Dept 8-6-14

 

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