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Advertising in New York and an Interactive Website Not Enough to Exercise Long-Arm Jurisdiction

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly dismissed an action against a Vermont ski business (Killington) because plaintiffs failed demonstrate a basis for New York’s long-arm jurisdiction. The court noted that advertising in New York and the existence of an interactive website through which out-of-state residents make reservations for participation in the defendant’s ski camp was not sufficient to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of New York courts:

Even assuming that Killington engaged in substantial advertising in New York, as the plaintiffs claim, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Killington also engaged in substantial activity within this State sufficient to satisfy the solicitation-plus standard. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, this Court’s decision in Grimaldi v Guinn (72 AD3d 37, 49-50) does not stand for the principle that a business’s interactive website, accessible in New York, subjects it to suit in this State for all purposes. Instead, the Grimaldi decision stands only for the more limited principle that a website may support specific jurisdiction in New York where the claim asserted has some relationship to the business transacted via the website … . Here, even Killington’s alleged substantial solicitation in New York constitutes no more than solicitation … .

CPLR 302(a)(1), the section of New York’s long-arm statute at issue in this case, grants New York courts jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries when the action arises out of the nondomiciliaries’ “transact[ion of] any business within the state or contract [] . . . to supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302[a][1]). Pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), jurisdiction is proper “even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted” … . “Purposeful activities are those with which a defendant, through volitional acts, avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws'” … . Mejia-Haffner v Killington, Ltd, 2014 NY Slip OP 05522, 2nd Dept 7-30-14

 

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