You are here: / / Plaintiff’s Decedent Fell to His Death in a Gorge on Property Owned...

Plaintiff’s Decedent Fell to His Death in a Gorge on Property Owned by Cornell University—Questions of Fact Re: Whether Plaintiff’s Decedent Was “Hiking” within the Meaning of the General Obligations Law (which Would Relieve the University of Liability) and Whether the Dangerous Condition Was Open and Obvious

The Third Department determined questions of fact had been raised about whether plaintiff’s decedent was “hiking” within the meaning of the General Obligations Law when he fell into a gorge to his death on property owned by defendant Cornell University in Ithaca.  The court also determined there was a question of fact whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious:

Defendant maintains that it is shielded from liability by General Obligations Law § 9-103 (1) (a), which, as pertinent here, “grants a special immunity to owners . . . from the usual duty to keep places safe” when individuals use their property for specified recreational activities, including hiking … . The enumerated activities covered under the statute “are essentially self-explanatory” …. “Hiking” has been described as “traveling through the woods on foot” … and as “traversing land ‘by foot or snowshoe for the purpose of pleasure or exercise'” … . Comparatively, this Court recently determined that a person walking her dogs on a paved walkway was not engaged in “hiking” under the statute …. With one exception not applicable here, a person engaged in one of the enumerated activities is “presumed to be doing so for recreational purposes” without regard to his or her subjective intent ….

The critical determination is whether decedent’s activity constituted “hiking” under the statute. As described, he ran down the gorge trail and, in that literal sense, was “traveling through the woods on foot,” or “hiking,” as defined in Sega v State of New York … . The statute, however, speaks to specified recreational categories reflecting the intent of the Legislature “to allow or encourage more people to use more accessible land for recreational enjoyment” … . Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the nonmoving party, we agree with Supreme Court that, under the distinctive fact pattern presented, defendant did not establish, as a matter of law, that decedent was “hiking” within the embrace of General Obligations Law § 9-103 (1) (a) at the time of his death … .  * * *

…[A] question of fact remains as to whether the cliff’s edge was visible and obvious or presented a latent, dangerous condition necessitating an appropriate warning… . King v Cornell Univ, 2014 NY Slip Op 05393, 3rd Dept 7-17-14

 

You might also like
FATHER PAID CHILD SUPPORT PRIOR TO SENTENCING FOR WILLFUL FAILURE TO PAY, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED THE ORDER OF COMMITMENT.
BY THE TIME OF SENTENCING FOR CONTEMPT FOR FATHER’S WILLFUL VIOLATION OF A SUPPORT ORDER, FATHER HAD PAID ALL THE ARREARS, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED HIS INCARCERATION (THIRD DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether State Exercised Due Diligence In Addressing Recurrent Blowing-Snow Problem on Highway
FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RELINQUISHED JURISDICTION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE INCONVENIENT FORUM FACTORS MANDATED BY THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW; MOTHER HAD RELOCATED TO FLORIDA WITH THE CHILDREN AND FATHER WAS SEEKING TELEPHONE AND ELECTRONIC CONTACT WITH THE CHILDREN (THIRD DEPT).
THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT FOLLOW THE CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS; EVEN WHERE THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED AN ARMED FELONY, WHICH CAN DISQUALIFY A DEFENDANT FROM THE STATUS, THE STATUTORY FACTORS WHICH WOULD NONETHELESS ALLOW YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND PLACED ON THE RECORD (THIRD DEPT).
DEFENDANTS’ EXPERTS’ CLAIMS THAT DEFENDANTS PROVIDED PROPER CARE AND ADVICE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WERE BELIED BY THE MEDICAL RECORDS AS EXPLAINED BY PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS; QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT SETTLED WHETHER THE RAPE SHIELD LAW APPLIES TO A CIVIL PROCEEDING, SUPREME COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT THE QUESTIONING OF PLAINTIFF’S DAUGHTER ABOUT HER SEXUAL HISTORY TO PREVENT EMBARRASSMENT AND HARASSMENT IN THIS NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CASE (THIRD DEPT).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S DETERMINATION THAT LOANS, NOTES AND MORTGAGES WERE PROHIBITED TRANSFERS UNDER THE MEDICAID LAW, TRIGGERING A PENALTY PERIOD BEFORE ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID NURSING HOME BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Deposit of Separate Funds in a Joint Account for One Month Converted the Separate... Questions of Fact Whether Handrail Which Did Not Extend to the Top of the Stairs...