Assault Counts Should Have Been Dismissed As Inclusory Concurrent Counts of the Counts Charging Assault in the First Degree as a Sexually Motivated Felony
The Fourth Department determined that counts of an indictment should have been dismissed as inclusory concurrent counts:
We agree with defendant … that the fourth and sixth counts of the indictment, each charging him with assault in the first degree, must be reversed and dismissed pursuant to CPL 300.30 (4) as inclusory concurrent counts of counts five and seven, each charging him with assault in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony. We therefore modify the judgment accordingly. CPL 300.30 (4) provides in pertinent part that “[c]oncurrent counts are inclusory’ when the offense charged in one is greater than any of those charged in the others and when the latter are all lesser offenses included within the greater.” A crime is a lesser included offense of another where “it is theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without at the same time committing the lesser . . . [, as] determined by a comparative examination of the statutes defining the two crimes, in the abstract” … . Here, “defendant could only commit the sexually motivated felon[ies] if it was proven that he had committed the underlying [assaults] and that the [assaults were] committed for his own sexual gratification” … . Thus, the underlying assault counts charging assault in the first degree should have been dismissed as inclusory concurrent counts of the counts charging assault in the first degree as a sexually motivated felony upon defendant’s conviction of the latter crime… . People v Dallas, 2014 NY Slip Op 05083, 4th Dept 7-3-14