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Defendant Not Afforded Right to Testify Before Grand Jury—Indictment Dismissed

The Second Department determined the indictment must be dismissed (without prejudice) because the defendant was not afforded his right to testify before the grand jury:

CPL 190.50(5) provides that a defendant has a right to appear and testify before a grand jury if he or she serves written notice of his or her intent to do so upon the District Attorney before an indictment is filed. “[T]he opportunity to testify prior to any Grand Jury vote is qualitatively different from and more advantageous than the opportunity to testify . . . after the Grand Jury ha[s] committed itself to a vote based on the prosecution’s ex parte presentment of evidence” … . Thus, a defendant who provides timely notice “prior to the prosecution’s presentment of evidence and prior to the Grand Jury vote on an indictment [is] entitled to testify before the vote” … .

Where, as here, the defendant has been arraigned upon an undisposed felony complaint, the People must notify the defendant of the grand jury proceeding and accord him or her a reasonable time to appear (see CPL 190.50[5][a]…). Here, the People’s notice pursuant to CPL 190.50 indicated that the defendant was “scheduled to testify” before the grand jury on June 8, 2010, and that his testimony was required to have been given before 5:00 p.m. on that date. The record reveals that the defendant provided the People with written notice of his intent to testify before the grand jury pursuant to CPL 190.50, at the latest, by 3:37 p.m. on June 7, 2010. Thus, the defendant provided the People with the requisite notice more than 24 hours in advance of his proposed appearance. Under these circumstances, the defendant was entitled to testify prior to the grand jury’s vote. People v Ellison, 2014 NY Slip Op 04957, 2nd Dept 7-2-14

 

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