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Question of Fact Whether Encroaching Hedge Was De Minimus Encroachment Re: Adverse Possession

The Second Department determined there was a question of fact about whether a hedge which encroached eight feet into plaintiff’s right of way was a “de minimus” encroachment within the meaning of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) (re: adverse possession):

RPAPL 543(1), which was enacted in 2008, provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the existence of de [minimis] non-structural encroachments including, but not limited to, fences, hedges, shrubbery, plantings, sheds and non-structural walls, shall be deemed to be permissive and non-adverse.” The plaintiff contends that pursuant to RPAPL 543(1), the existence of all encroaching hedges and shrubbery, no matter how large, shall be deemed permissive and non-adverse. Under the plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute, the list of examples contained in RPAPL 543(1) are examples of “de [minimis] non-structural encroachments.” We reject this interpretation. The more reasonable interpretation of RPAPL 543(1) is that the list contains examples of “non-structural encroachments” which could still be adverse if they are not de minimis. This reading gives effect to the words “de [minimis],” while the plaintiff’s interpretation would render those words superfluous. “It is a cardinal principle to be observed in construing legislation that . . . whenever practicable, effect must be given to all the language employed. Our duty is to presume that each clause . . . has a purpose” … . Wright v Sokoloff, 2013 NY Slip Op 06856, 2nd Dept 10-23-13

 

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