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New York Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Intra-Tribal Matters

The First Department determined New York courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over an election dispute concerning competing tribal councils.  The court also addressed the waiver of sovereignty by a Native American tribe and noted that the jurisdiction of a New York court conveyed by 25 USC 233 does not extend beyond the borders of the state (tribe was located in California):

New York courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the internal affairs of Indian tribes” … . “[A]n election dispute concerning competing tribal councils” is a “non-justiciable intra-tribal matter” … . Appellants seek a declaration that defendant Chukchansi Economic Development Authority (CEDA) is lawfully governed by a board composed of seven named individuals; however, appellants themselves allege in their counterclaim and cross claims that the members of the CEDA Board are the same as the members of defendant Tribal Council of the Tribe of Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians. Wells Fargo Bank NA v Chukchansi Economic Dev Auth, 2014 NY Slip Op 04437, 1st Dept 6-17-14

 

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