You are here: / / Suspended Judgment Should Not Have Been Granted in Termination-of-Parental-Rights...

Suspended Judgment Should Not Have Been Granted in Termination-of-Parental-Rights Proceeding

The Second Department, over a partial dissent, determined Family Court should not have granted a suspended judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights:

After a dispositional hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights, a court may dismiss the petition, terminate parental rights and commit guardianship to the agency, or suspend judgment for a period of up to one year (see Family Ct Act §§ 631, 633[b]). “A dispositional order suspending judgment is a dispositional alternative, upon a finding of permanent neglect, that affords a brief grace period designed to prepare the parent to be reunited with the child'” … . Although this disposition provides a parent with a “second chance,” it is appropriate only where it is also in the best interests of the children … . A suspended judgment is not appropriate where a parent has failed to gain insight into the problems which led to the children’s removal in the first instance … . Moreover, to warrant a suspended judgment, “a parent must demonstrate that progress has been made to overcome the specific problems that led to the removal of the children. Mere attempts are not sufficient” … . Matter of Chanel C, 2014 NY Slip Op 04226, 2nd Dept 6-11-14

 

You might also like
Preclusion Proper Remedy for Failure to Comply with Discovery Deadlines and Requests
PETITIONER WAS REQUIRED TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM PURSUANT TO CPLR 9802 IN AN ACTION SEEKING A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT A LOCAL LAW WAS INVALID, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL RELEASE PROCURED BY FRAUD OR IN UNFAIR CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE BANK FAILED TO SUBMIT THE BUSINESS RECORDS RELIED ON IN ITS AFFIDAVIT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION RENDERING THE AFFIDAVIT INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY; SUPREME COURT’S DETERMINATION THE BANK HAD COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 AND THE MORTGAGE WAS THE LAW OF THE CASE PRECLUDING RECONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE PURSUANT TO DEFENDANTS’ CROSS MOTION (SECOND DEPT).
LOANING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT A CAR WITH A BROKEN FUEL GAUGE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH; THE CAR RAN OUT OF GAS AND PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT PULLED OVER ONTO THE SHOULDER OF A TWO-LANE ROAD; SHE WAS STRUCK BY A HIT AND RUN DRIVER WHILE PUTTING GAS IN THE CAR WITH A GAS CAN (SECOND DEPT).
BECAUSE THE PRIOR FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING, THE PRIOR ACTION DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT; THEREFORE DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE INSTANT ACTION WAS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).
Despite the Fact that Defendant Entered Guilty Pleas in Two Counties, Only One SORA Disposition for the “Current Offenses” (Which Included the Offenses from Both Counties) Can Be Held
DESPITE THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING THAT THE INSURANCE LAW PROVISION REQUIRING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE DOES NOT APPLY TO POLICE VEHICLES, PLAINTIFF POLICE OFFICER, INJURED IN AN ACCIDENT WITH AN UNINSURED MOTORIST WHILE DRIVING HIS POLICE VEHICLE, WAS ENTITLED TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE UNDER HIS OWN PERSONAL INSURANCE POLICY (SECOND DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Priority in Custody Disputes Given to Party Initially Awarded Custody Mother’s Request to Relocate Properly Granted