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Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment Causes of Action Should Not Have Been Dismissed

The First Department reversed Supreme Court and found plaintiff had sufficiently pled the causes of action for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.  Plaintiff lived with and took care of an elderly woman for six years, an obligation undertaken by the defendant.  Although plaintiff was given room and board, as well as health insurance, by the defendant, she was never paid for her work.  The suit was based upon plaintiff’s allegation that defendant had promised to compensate her. The Supreme Court found the “compensation-promise” allegation incredible because plaintiff worked for six years without pay. The First Department noted that whether the “compensation-promise” allegation was credible was solely a matter for the jury.  The court explained the elements of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment:

Generally, under the doctrine of quantum meruit, “the performance and acceptance of services gives rise to the inference of an implied contract to pay for the reasonable value of such services” … . To state a cause of action for quantum meruit, plaintiff must allege “(l) the performance of the services in good faith, (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered, (3) an expectation of compensation therefor, and (4) the reasonable value of the services” … .

Allegations that plaintiff provided personal services in good faith … on behalf of defendant … are sufficient. Similarly, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the element of acceptance via allegations that defendant, inter alia, placed her on … group insurance, filed tax returns on her behalf, and submitted visa applications in which she represented that plaintiff was an employee … . * * *

Similarly, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged, at this juncture, that defendant … was unjustly enriched at her expense. To state a cause of action for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that (1) defendant was enriched, (2) at plaintiff’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit [] defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered” … . A person may be unjustly enriched not only where she receives money or property, but also where she otherwise receives a benefit … . Such a benefit may be conferred where the person’s debt is satisfied or where she is otherwise saved expense or loss … .

* * * The fact that plaintiff may have been compensated, in part, by room and board and health insurance, is not dispositive on the question of whether she received adequate compensation for her services, and does not bar the claim at the pleading stage … . Farina v Bastianich, 2014 NY Slip Op 02661, 1st Dept 4-17-14

 

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