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Court Has Discretion to Deny a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute Pursuant to CPLR 3216 Even in the Absence of an Adequate Excuse and a Showing of a Potentially Meritorious Cause of Action

In finding plaintiff did not intend to abandon the action, the Second Department explained the “extremely forgiving” nature of CPLR 3216:

Where a 90-day demand to resume prosecution of an action pursuant to CPLR 3216(b)(3) has been properly served, a plaintiff may avoid dismissal, as a matter of law, by either timely filing a note of issue or moving, before the default date, to vacate the notice or to extend the 90-day period (see CPLR 3216[c]…). Even where a plaintiff has failed to pursue either of these options, however, “the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing a complaint based on failure to prosecute whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay and the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action” … .

Moreover, CPLR 3216 is an “extremely forgiving” statute …, which “never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action based on the plaintiff’s unreasonable neglect to proceed” … . Under the plain language of CPLR 3216, a court retains some “residual discretion” to deny a motion to dismiss, even when a plaintiff fails to comply with the 90-day requirement and additionally fails to proffer an adequate excuse for the delay or a potentially meritorious cause of action … . Thus, while the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing a complaint based on failure to prosecute whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay and the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 3216[e]…), “such a dual showing is not strictly necessary in order for the plaintiff to escape such a dismissal” … .

Here, the record demonstrates affirmative steps taken by the plaintiff to continue the prosecution of this action that are inconsistent with an intent to abandon it. Ramon v Zangari, 2014 NY Slip Op 02420, 2nd Dept 4-9-14

 

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