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Failure to Prove Shared Intent (Accessorial Liability) Required Dismissal of Robbery Counts Under a Weight of the Evidence Analysis

The Second Department, after a weight of the evidence review, determined there was insufficient proof defendant shared the intent to commit the robbery and dismissed the relevant counts of the indictment:

Here, the defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted robbery in the second degree under a theory of accessorial liability. “To sustain a conviction based upon accessorial liability, the evidence . . . must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted with the mental culpability necessary to commit the crime charged and that, in furtherance thereof, he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided the principal to commit such crime'” (…see Penal Law § 20.00…).Upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15), we determine, in the first instance, that acquittal of the charges of attempted robbery in the second degree would not have been unreasonable based upon the evidence presented and, moreover, that the jury failed to accord the evidence the weight it should have been accorded … . The evidence presented at trial did not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant shared the intent to commit robbery, or that he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned, or intentionally aided the principal in committing the offense of attempted robbery in the second degree. Accordingly, the convictions of attempted robbery in the second degree and the sentences imposed thereon must be vacated, and those counts of the indictment must be dismissed … . People v Marchena, 2014 NY Slip Op 02312, 2nd Dept 4-2-14

 

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