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“Relation-Back” Doctrine Applied Where City Mistakenly Not Named in the Complaint and Statute of Limitations Had Run

The Second Department determined the amended complaint against the city should not have been dismissed.  Plaintiff tripped and fell on the Brooklyn Bridge.  Plaintiff’s notice of claim named the NYC Department of Transportation (DOT) and the city.  However, when the plaintiff commenced an action, only the DOT was named in the complaint.  The city moved to dismiss after the statute of limitations had run.  The Second Department held that the “relation-back” doctrine applied and the city was compelled to accept the amended complaint.  In explaining the “relation-back” doctrine, the court wrote:

Although the statute of limitations had expired on the cause of action insofar as asserted against the City, the plaintiff successfully demonstrated a basis for application of the relation back doctrine (see CPLR 203[b]…). In order for claims against one defendant to relate back to claims asserted against another, a plaintiff must establish that ” (1) both claims arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence, (2) the new party is united in interest with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that the new party will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits by the delayed, otherwise stale, commencement and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against that party as well'” … . Here, the plaintiff’s claim against the City and the claim against the DOT arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, and the City is united in interest with the DOT such that it can be charged with notice of the action commenced by the plaintiff against the DOT … . Moreover, no prejudice can be asserted by the City, given that a notice of claim was timely served upon both the City and the DOT, and the City proceeded to negotiate a settlement with the plaintiff. The plaintiff further demonstrated that her initial failure to name the City as a defendant was a mistake, rather than an intentional decision not to assert the claim in order to gain a tactical advantage… . Headley v City of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 01717, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

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