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County Not Necessary Party In Suit to Recover Taxes Wrongfully Paid to Town

The Second Department determined plaintiff [Verizon] could seek the refund of wrongfully collected taxes against the town which collected them and the town could then seek reimbursement from the county.  The county was not a necessary party in the action brought by the plaintiff.  Plaintiff was the owner of “mass property” (power lines, poles, transformers, etc) which had been subject to taxes for refuse collection.  The Court of Appeals ruled “mass property,” which produced no garbage, could not be so taxed:

Pursuant to the County Guaranty, the County is liable for refunds of tax payments made in connection with levies for special ad valorem taxes … . However, in the actions at bar, Verizon chose to seek refunds from the Town, to which the payments had been made, rather than from the County directly. That was proper in light of our determination that the County is not a necessary party to actions seeking refunds of tax payments made in connection with levies for special ad valorem taxes … . Accordingly, while the Town may seek indemnification from the County pursuant to the County Guaranty, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the Town is liable for these refunds in the first instance, and can be sued directly by a taxpayer. Thus, the Supreme Court did not err in entering the judgments against the Town defendants.  New York Tel Co v Supervisor of Town of Hempstead, 2014 NY Slip Op 01726, 2nd Dept 3-19-14

 

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