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Question of Fact Whether a “Special Relationship” Had Developed Such that the Insurance Broker Might Be Liable for Negligent Advice About Coverage

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, over a dissent, the Court of Appeals determined there was a question of fact whether the relationship between the insurance broker and the plaintiff was a “special relationship” such that the broker might be liable for negligent advice about sufficient coverage. Plaintiff was a business owner who suffered losses for business interruption caused by several roof-failures. The issue was whether the insurance the broker advised plaintiff to purchase was sufficient for plaintiff’s needs. The court explained the general principles involved:

As a general principle, insurance brokers “have a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage for their clients within a reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to do so; however, they have no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct a client to obtain additional coverage” … . Hence, in the ordinary broker-client setting, the client may prevail in a negligence action only where it can establish that it made a particular request to the broker and the requested coverage was not procured. * * *Where a special relationship develops between the broker and client, we have also indicated that the broker may be liable, even in the absence of a specific request, for failing to advise or direct the client to obtain additional coverage … . In Murphy [90 NY2d at 272] , we recognized that “particularized situations may arise in which insurance agents, through their conduct or by express or implied contract with customers and clients, may assume or acquire duties in addition to those fixed at common law” and that the question of whether such additional responsibilities should be “given legal effect is governed by the particular relationship between the parties and is best determined on a case-by-case basis” … . We identified three exceptional situations that may give rise to a special relationship, thereby creating an additional duty of advisement:”(1) the agent receives compensation for consultation apart from payment of the premiums; (2) there was some interaction regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the agent; or (3) there is a course of dealing over an extended period of time which would have put objectively reasonable insurance agents on notice that their advice was being sought and specially relied on” … . Voss v The Netherlands Insurance Company…, 11, CtApp 2-25-14

 

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