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Resentencing Under Drug Law Reform Act Is Available to a Persistent Felony Offender As Long As the Offender Has Not Been Convicted of Any of the Serious Offenses Enumerated in Correction Law 803

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, resolved a conflict among the appellate division departments about the applicability of the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) to persistent felony offenders.  The court determined that the resentencing allowed by the DLRA for certain drug-related offenses is available to persistent felony offenders who have not been convicted of any of the serious crimes enumerated in Correction Law 803:

The Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (see L 2009, ch 56, § 1, hereinafter “2009 DLRA”) provides remedial resentencing to low-level non-violent felony drug offenders who meet various basic eligibility requirements (see CPL 440.46 [1]). The 2009 DLRA, however, denies resentencing to any offender who is serving a sentence for an “exclusion offense,” which is, among other things, an “offense for which a merit time allowance is not available pursuant to [Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii)]” (CPL 440.46 [5]; CPL 440.46 [5] [a] [ii]). Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii), in turn, makes a merit time allowance unavailable to an offender who is serving a sentence imposed for any of the violent or sexual crimes specifically enumerated in that statute, without regard to the offender's predicate sentencing status (see Correction Law § 803 [1] [d] [ii]). That statute also prevents any offender serving a sentence “authorized for an A-I felony offense” from receiving a merit time allowance (id.), thereby denying such an allowance to anyone who has been sentenced as a persistent felony offender (see Penal Law §§ 70.02 [2] [a]; 70.02 [3] [a] [i]; 70.10 [2]).

In interpreting the language of these interlocking statutes, the Departments of the Appellate Division are divided over the proper answer to the following question: does the DLRA resentencing exclusion apply to all offenders who are ineligible to receive a merit time allowance, including those who cannot receive those allowances solely by virtue of their recidivist sentencing adjudications; or, to the contrary, does it apply only to offenders who have been convicted of certain serious crimes that are specifically listed in Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii) and eliminate the possibility of a merit time allowance regardless of an offender's recidivist sentencing adjudication? We hold that the exclusion applies only to offenders who have been convicted of one or more of the serious crimes that automatically render merit time allowances unavailable under Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii), and that therefore an offender who has no such conviction may be resentenced, notwithstanding his or her adjudication as a persistent felony offender. People v Coleman, 2014 NY Slip Op 07010, CtApp 10-16-2014

 

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